Essays on the Industrial Organization of Ocean Shipping by Bailey, Samuel
Essays on the Industrial Organization of Ocean Shipping
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY
Samuel M. Bailey
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
Doctor of Philosophy
Thomas J. Holmes, Advisor
May, 2021
© Samuel M. Bailey 2021
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to my advisor, Thomas J. Holmes, and committee members Doireann Fitzger-
ald, Amil Petrin, and Joel Waldfogel. All have provided excellent advice. Tom, Amil, and
Joel have also been invaluable as members of the Minnesota Applied Micro Workshop. I
would also like to thank the rest of the participants of the workshop for their comments and
support. Serafin Grundl, Cailin Slattery and Helen Willis Banga all gave helpful feedback
on early drafts of the first chapter. Finally, I would like to thank employees at the port
authorities in Long Beach, Oakland, Houston, and Seattle for providing me with their data.
i
Dedication
To my parents, Michael and Suzanne Bailey.
ii
Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters on the industrial organization of ocean ship-
ping. In the first chapter, I study the investment decisions of US ports. Transportation
infrastructure is characterized by two opposing forces: economies of scale that encourage
centralization, and spread-out consumers that encourage dispersion. These forces may not
be correctly balanced in the United States as decisions are made by many different regional
authorities which receive large federal subsidies. I study seaports during a period when
those on the East Coast were making investments to prepare for the larger vessels that
could navigate an expanded Panama Canal. With data on all container imports and capi-
tal costs of major US ports, I estimate a model of the investment game that port authorities
play. Competing ports invest more than a social planner would, even allowing for deviations
from profit maximization, because they do not internalize their business stealing effects on
others. In particular, the $1.7 billion expansion of the Port of New York and New Jersey
would not have been chosen by a coastal authority. Social surplus would be over a billion
dollars higher with coordination, the equivalent of about one year’s worth of revenue for
all the East Coast ports. Lowering federal subsidies appears to lower much of the gap. In
the second chapter, I show how port productivity changed after a historic labor agreement.
Across many industries, employers and workers often argue over technology adoption. In
2008, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union signed a contract agreeing that all
ports on the US West Coast could fully automate their terminals, recognizing there would
be job losses. Using a new, ship-level dataset of the labor it takes to unload ships, I study
changes in productivity after the contract was signed and after one port automated. Having
the ship-level data is important, as I show more aggregate measures would produce mis-
leading estimates. I find productivity increased about 25% as a result of the new contract
and an additional 15% among the port that actually automated. I find that the effects did
not completely persist through the 2015 contract, even though the automation clause did
not change, and suggest possible ways employee-employer relations may alter outside the
written contract.
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Chapter 1
Competition and Coordination in
Infrastructure: Port Authorities’
Decisions to Become “Big Ship Ready”
1.1 Introduction
In the United States, regional authorities often compete with one another. There has been
a long line of research since at least Charles Tiebout in 1956 studying when this competition
is more efficient than a centralized government. When businesses and residents have het-
erogenous costs and preferences, authorities that differentiate themselves can be beneficial.
However, there may also be Prisoners’ Dilemma scenarios, where both regions would benefit
by committing to a lower level of investment. These investments are frequently subsidized
by outside authorities, so lower levels may be beneficial not only to locals but the entire
country.
Over the past ten years there has been a flurry of infrastructure investment by port au-
thorities on the East Coast in response to the expansion of the Panama Canal, announced
in 2006 and completed in 2016. The Canal grew to allow a ship size almost three times
the pre-expansion maximum. Larger ships can carry more containers with the same size
crew and proportionally less fuel, so there are increasing returns to scale. However, these
economies of scale are wasted if a port is not deep enough to allow the ship to unload.
These authorities are all regional and they rushed to invest to make their ports more at-
tractive to importers potentially without internalizing the effects their investments would
have on the business of other ports. These projects are also highly subsidized by the federal
government, making the investments even more attractive to individual ports.
In this chapter, I study whether competition between port authorities and the subsidies
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they receive have led to excess or insufficient investment in container ports. I find that
there was at least a billion dollars in excess investment. By “excess investment” I mean
investment that does not increase social welfare more than it costs. I estimate substitution
patterns between ports using the universe of waterborne container imports and a hand-
collected panel of port characteristics, which includes the money spent on investments to
prepare ports for larger ships possible after the Panama Canal expanded. Using these
substitution parameters and economies of scale parameters estimated from other work, I
model the investment game port authorities play. These data are detailed enough that I
can generalize the port authorities’ objectives beyond that of profit-maximizers, and so my
welfare results take seriously what the port authorities are actually striving for.
Though there has been a long literature studying regional competition, starting with
(Tiebout (1956)). More recently, researchers have started using empirical techniques de-
veloped in industrial organization or auction theory to study fiscal competition, such as
(Slattery (2019)). However, there has been relatively little work focusing on infrastructure
investment. This is surprising, given 1) infrastructure spending is a large part of state total
spending and 2) most infrastructure spending in the US is done on the regional level. For
example, firm-level tax incentives, which have been the subject of much research, totaled
a little under $50 billion in 2015 (Bartik (2019)). By comparison, state and local govern-
ments spent around $340 billion on transportation and water infrastructure in 2017. This
is a large amount in dollar amount but also as a fraction of total infrastructure spending.
In the same year, federal spending was below $100 billion, less than one-third that of states
and localities (Office (2018)).
I focus on container ports. These are a vital part of US international trade: about half of
trade by value is waterborne, and about half of waterborne trade is containerized (Chambers
and Liu (2012)). There is a large amount of investment in these ports. In a 2012 survey,
ports reported plans to spend $18.3 billion dollars over the next four years, and $22.6
billion from 2016-2020 (American Association of Port Authorities (2016)). All of these
spending decisions are made by authorities often responsible to governments as small as
municipalities. They may even be neighboring: Los Angeles and Long Beach are controlled
by different port authorities, despite being less than five miles apart and in the same bay.
There are theoretical reasons competition could be either good or bad for total welfare.
The reasons why competition could be good are intuitive: without it, ports may not be
compelled to make investments that lower costs.1 There may also be gains from variety,
especially as regards to the different physical locations of each port. Importers consider
not only port fees but the total freight charges on land and on sea. Different ports will
1 For example, (Holmes and Schmitz (2001)) describe how port workers in the nineteenth century took
advantage of their “bottleneck” position until development of rail forced them to improve.
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be associated with different charges for different importers. These are positive outcomes
of ports being decentralized. However, a long-standing result in the industrial organization
literature is that in markets where a single firm’s output decision affects the decision of
other firms (i.e., in markets that are not perfectly competitive), there may be excess entry
(Mankiw and Whinston (1986)). The reasoning is as follows: when a firm chooses to enter,
it cares only about its expected payoffs. Upon entry, though, all other firms will reduce
their output (or imports in the case of ports). This reduction in output is a cost not
internalized by the firm, and as with any negative externality, there will be too much of it
in a market equilibrium. The gains from variety are also not internalized by the firm but
are a positive externality. Whether there is over, under, or optimal entry depends on which
of these effects dominate.
In order to say whether there is over- or underinvestment, I need an efficient benchmark
for what “optimal investment” looks like, and for this I need a model of the main agents
involved: importers, carriers, and especially port authorities. Importers are located in
particular places in the U.S. and ship goods from particular places abroad. They choose
which port to have their good sent to, taking as given characteristics of the port (including
the port’s distance to the importer). Given their quasi-public nature, authorities may
care about more than just profits, and so I allow for them to be concerned with total
quantities in addition to profits. They compete with one another by investing in harbors
that can accommodate larger ships, and these investments are subsidized by the federal
government. Because larger ships have lower average costs, ports increasing their capacity
is the equivalent of those ports shortening the distances between them and foreign origins.
Thus though these investments are costly, they lower the effective price of importers who
choose them.
I can identify these parameters from ship charter rates and technical specifications, the
universe of waterborne container imports, and hand-collected data on port infrastructure
and cost. A wide range of ship sizes existed even before the Canal expansion for routes that
do not involve the United States, and a liquid and competitive charter market allows me
to identify scale parameters by comparing the relationship between charter prices and size.
For importers’ substitution parameters, I use the fact that import origin and destination
are exogenous. I can identify the cost of land transport from importers that have the same
origin and same sized ship but different destinations. Ocean costs are identified similarly,
from importers with same sized ship and same final destination but different origins. Finally,
I take a revealed preference approach to bound the weight ports put on quantity. The scale
and demand parameters allow me to predict what profits would be if ports did not invest.
I therefore observe the realized profits, alternative profits, and cost of investment. The
alternative profits generally exceed the realized ones, and this difference identifies the lower
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bound for the weight on quantity.
I estimate economies of scale and substitution parameters and then use these to consider
counterfactuals. I find economies of scale are quite high, with average cost elasticities of 0.2-
0.33.2 Even for smaller vessels, the relative costs of shipping by land compared to ocean
are much higher. I also find land costs are relatively high compared to sea: moving one
container on land one kilometer is about 13 times as much as moving that same container
one kilometer at sea on a 5,000 TEU vessel. Importers thus benefit from differentiation (in
the form of geographically spread out ports) as well as economies of scale.
To see whether differentiation or economies of scale dominates, I consider counterfactual
scenarios where not all ports invest in expanding. I find that ports coordinating among
themselves would choose not to expand New York or Houston (depending on the exact
form of the port authority objective). These choices provide greater total surplus for ports;
they also provide greater total surplus as the cost savings from investment more than makes
up for lower importer surplus. Although the port decisions without federal subsidies are
still inefficient, the taxes that would be necessary to change behavior are much smaller.
The subsidies have a large effect on the total welfare if not the physical allocation.
Importantly, New York would individually not want to go along with this plan; it would
still be individually more profitable to invest. Just as tax competition between states can
lower total surplus, it seems that ports competing with one another leads them to invest
more than is socially desirable.
1.2 Literature
Many researchers have studied the effects of transportation infrastructure on total output
or productivity; see (Turner et al. (2020)) and (Ramey (2020)) for recent overviews. There
is no clear consensus on how important it is for output, but most acknowledge that the
efficiency of transportation infrastructure varies greatly over space and time. (Turner et al.
(2020)) find social welfare weights for several different modes of transportation and compare
these to the implicit weights from government spending. They find the two sets of weights
are wildly different, meaning infrastructure investment is inefficient. However, this and
other papers study optimal national policy when states are not strategic agents. Outcomes
that may seem inexplicable when there is a single planner, such as excessive investment
in some areas, make much more sense when we consider that the investing agents are
sometimes working at cross-purposes with one another. The paper closest to mine in this
strand is (Hulten and Schwab (1997)), who study the effects of tax exemption on municipal
2 That is, increasing ship size by 1 percent lowers average cost per container by 0.2-33 percent. A 8,000
twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) ship has average costs 12 to 20 percent lower than a 5,000 TEU one.
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bonds and infrastructure subsidies. Because they are looking at aggregate investments,
though, they cannot model the oligopolistic game being played by the agents as I do with
port authorities.
There is another literature that does study competition between states or localities, starting
with(Tiebout (1956)). The way states compete in these papers is through fiscal policy
(such as tax credits or subsidies) or through public goods consumed directly by households
(such as better schools or parks). A recent example is (Slattery (2019)), which studies
states competing for firms locating there through subsidies. Such competition may be
welfare enhancing if there are spillovers, as firms do not internalize the full surplus they
generate. My work differs in that I study capital investment rather than fiscal policies.
These policies are a much larger fraction of state budgets, about three times as much, as
business incentives.
I also draw on results on “excess entry” in the industrial organization literature. A long-
standing result is that in markets where a single firm’s output decision affects the decision
of other firms (i.e., in markets that are not perfectly competitive), there may be excess
entry (Mankiw and Whinston (1986)). The reasoning is as follows: when a firm chooses
to enter, it cares only about its expected payoffs. Upon entry, though, all other firms will
reduce their output (or imports in the case of ports). This reduction in output is a cost not
internalized by the firm, and as with any negative externality, there will be too much of it
in a market equilibrium. The gains from variety are also not internalized by the firm but
are a positive externality. Whether there is over, under, or optimal entry depends on which
of these effects dominate. This has been studied theoretically by (Mankiw and Whinston
(1986)) and found to be empirically relevant by (Berry and Waldfogel (1999)). Instead
of profit maximizers, I study quasi-public authorities who may internalize some of these
externalities already. I thus need to generalize the agents’ objectives to allow for this fact.
Finally, many researchers in maritime economics have studied competition between ports.
(De Langen and Pallis (2006)) and (Lee and Meng (2015)) discuss the growing devolution
of port authority in Europe and Asia, respectively, and how the distribution of trade has
changed over time. There has been less work studying competition among U.S. ports,
possibly because there has always been less of a country-level port policy in that country.
An exception is a Federal Maritime Commission report from 2012, though that focuses on
competition between U.S. ports and Canadian and Mexican ports, not competition between
U.S. ports themselves. (Ishii et al. (2013)) is a recent example that is closest to my approach.
The authors model ports as making capacity investments in alternating periods, and then
given those capacities, setting prices simultaneously. They derive several propositions whose
results they compare to the ports of Busan and Kobe, but they do not do any estimation.
My model of port investment is very similar to theirs; however, the bill of ladings microdata
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allows me to actually estimate the model, rather than derive only qualitative results.
1.3 Background
1.3.1 Port organization
Unlike many other countries, there is no single agency that administers U.S. seaports. In-
stead, they are governed by a variety of state, municipal, and regional authorities. Though
all these authorities are ultimately responsible to elected officials, their operational inde-
pendence varies: for example, the Massachusetts Port Authority is explicitly chartered to
not be subject to control by other agencies, whereas the North Carolina State Ports Au-
thority is within the state’s transportation department (Sherman (2008)). In some cases,
the authority board of commissioners is required to have at least some members from parts
of the state far from the port, to guarantee the welfare of more than just the port city
is being considered (Sherman (2008)). There are also differences in funding: most of the
larger ports can cover their own operational costs, but may receive funding for select capital
projects from the state or local governments. Others may have a guaranteed revenue from
the state coming out of a specific tax or trust. The Virginia Port Authority, for example,
receives revenue from the Commonwealth Port Fund, which is tied to highway taxes (Joint
Legislative Audit and Review Commission (2013)).
Outside of government revenue or bonds, port authority’s revenue comes from two major
sources: rentals and the fees charged to ships that enter on its own terminals. There
are many different kinds of fees for things like crane usage, refueling, water usage, etc.
The main ones are wharfage, which is a per-weight or per-container fee for unloading,
and dockage, which is a per-ship fee for docking at the port (though the fee will usually
vary depending on the size of the ship) (American Association of Port Authorities (2019)).
From the information available, wharfage is the larger of the two. For example, out of the
approximately $398 million the Port of Los Angeles made from shipping services in 2017,
$369 million, over 90%, were from wharfage. Thinking of fees as per container rather than
per ship or per importer is therefore reasonable. I go into more details in the Data section.
Though ports are in the business of other types of imports, here I restrict attention to
containers for three reasons. First, for most of the largest ports, containers are the primary
source of revenue from shipping services. For the Port of Los Angeles, about 93% of
imports by weight were from containers, and even more by revenue (Finance and of Port
of Los Angeles (2019)). Second, containers are, by design, standardized. It is rare for two
containers of the same volume to be charged different rates, regardless of commodity or
even weight. (In theory, heavier containers may be charged more, but it is rare for weight
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rather than volume to be the limiting factor (Holmes and Singer (2018)).) Finally, because
containers are often not opened until near the end of their journey, the port of entry (where
it goes through customs) may be different from the port of unlading (where it comes off the
ship). This allows me to see from customs data alone not only where a container physically
entered the United States, but where it was unpacked.
1.3.2 Panama Canal expansion and container shipping
In 2006, Panamanians voted to add two new locks and to deepen existing channels. The
decision was due in part to the growing size of containerships. As late as the mid-1990s, there
was no containership in the world that exceeded the roughly 5,000 twenty-foot equivalent
units3 (TEU) of the Panama Canal. Around a decade later, when the plans for expansion
began, the average size of a newly built ship was still below the limit. That was not the
case when the expansion was finished, on June 26, 2016. By that point, the largest ships in
the world were almost 20,000 TEU, and the average newly built ship was around 7,500 –
well above the previous maximum allowable size. (Merk et al. (2015)). The new maximum
of about 13,000 TEU was more than twice as large as the previous maximum.
There would have been no reason for the Canal to expand if it were not for the large
economies of scale that exist for container ships. Average cost is almost always decreasing,
limited only by demand and the infrastructure of canals and ports. There is “engineering”
evidence of this: the resistance of water increases with the surface area of the vessel, not the
volume. We can also see the economies of scale from the behavior of the carriers. Almost
immediately after the expansion, carriers that had weekly services of two vessels around the
maximum capacity switch to weekly service of only one larger vessel. Overall, the average
vessel size of shipments from East Asia to the U.S. East Coast (which often though do
not always go through the Panama Canal) increased by around 2,000 TEU following the
expansion.
In the context of port infrastructure, the Canal expansion is important because it spurred
ports on the East Coast to invest in becoming “Big Ship Ready.” These investments were
dramatic. The Bayonne Bridge, one of the largest steel arch bridges in the world, was
raised over 50 feet at a cost of $1.7 billion in order to allow larger ships to enter the Port of
New York and New Jersey. The Port of Savannah is currently near the end of a dredging
project that deepened the harbor by 5 feet and cost over $970 million (Ronan (2020)). These
projects all began after the decision to expand the Panama Canal was announced, and were
explicitly presented as necessary because of the expansion. The ports also recognized that
their investments would pay off potentially at the expense of other ports (Booth (2013)).
3 One twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) is one half a standard 40-foot container.
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1.4 Model
To say whether investment is excessive or insufficient, I need a way to compare the costs
to the benefits it brings importers and ports. There is a trade-off between the economies
of scale from concentrating shipping and the benefits of variety. To accurately measure
the benefits I build on standard discrete choice demand models, incorporating important,
individual-level features of this market: the economies of scale in ocean shipping, ocean
distance, land distance, and port fee at the container level. For the costs I model the ports
as choosing a level of investment that determines the largest ships that can unload there.
Investment is expensive but indirectly lowers the cost for importers, bringing them to the
port. Port authorities care about ships entering ports because it increases profits, but they
also care about the total quantity for its own sake.
1.4.1 Overview
Importers have inelastic demand for containers from a foreign origin port o in U.S. desti-
nation d. Origin ports are always container seaports; the U.S. locations may be a port or
an inland location. Importers choose a seaport j. This determines the journey a shipment
takes from origin o to port j by water, and then from port j to destination d by land.
There is a trade-off between ports that are expensive to get to by land but which may have
low prices for the ocean leg of the journey. The total number of containers going from
origin o to seaport (not final destination) j is qo,j . This last number will be important in
determining the size of the ship used.
Ocean carriers move containers from foreign ports to domestic ones. They take as given
the total number of containers being shipped on the route qo,j , and choose the size of the
ship to minimize average cost.
Land carriers are a competitive sector that charge a constant price per unit distance.
Ports behave strategically, taking as given the actions of other ports. Their main decision
is whether to invest in infrastructure that allows post-Panamax vessels to unload there.
1.4.2 Importers
I assume importers make decisions separately for each shipment4 . They consider the price
of moving the container by land from the domestic port to the final destination, pland,j,d
and the price of moving it by sea from the foreign port to the domestic, psea,o,j . I allow each
port to have an unobserved cost for all importers, ξj , that can vary over time. This may be
how quickly the port can unload ships, or an especially valuable rail connection. Finally,
4 A “shipment” may be one or more or even a fraction of a container. I treat all containers in the same
shipment as having the same idiosyncratic cost εij .
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importers bear some individual cost shock, εij , that is independent and uncorrelated with
any other port feature.
The importers face the problem
max
j∈J
−α (psea,o,j + pland,j,d) + ξj + εij (1.1)
1.4.3 Ocean carriers
The ocean carriers’ “problem” in the model is almost trivial. In reality, ocean carriers
are strategic and important agents, and so this section of the model is the most simplified.
Below I go into detail on which of these details may be important and why I am nevertheless
comfortable making them for the model.
Ocean carriers take the quantities going from foreign ports to domestic ones as given. They
have an increasing returns to scale technology and choose the ship size S that minimizes
average cost, subject to the constraints of canals or ports. I model the choice of vessel
size in a reduced-form manner as a function of the total route quantity, and domestic port
capacity. (I assume foreign ports are not a binding constraint.) Let the vessel size be S
and So,j = S (qo,j , ωj), where ωj is the “maximum” allowed at port j. (Because investment
is a binary decision, ωj ∈ {0, 1}.) S (·, ·, ·) is increasing in all three terms. No ship is “too
large” to enter any port; however, it is very costly for larger ships to enter ports that are
not Big Ship Ready. (This last feature is motivated by even “too large” ships being able to
enter most ports at great inconvenience, see the Data section for examples.)
In treating vessel size as an exogenous function of only qo,j and ωj , the model is missing
the effects of traffic to nearby ports. For example, ships with only a few containers going to
Long Beach may still be quite large because they make large deliveries to Los Angeles next
door. However, the shape and direction of the function still holds: larger qo,j and larger ωj
both weakly increase the size.
After choosing the vessel that minimizes average cost, carriers simply charge this cost to the
importers. In reality, the ocean carrier market is itself imperfectly competitive, and they
likely charge a markup over their cost. For simplicity I abstract away from any strategic
behavior on the carriers’ side. As long as the price moves in the same direction as the costs,
the direction of my results should still hold, and the magnitudes should not be too far off
if markups are reasonably constant.
The carriers charge
psea,o,j = f (S (qo,j , ωj) , D (o, j) ;βsea) + pj + ϕ (S (qo,j , ωj) , ωj) (1.2)
where pj is the per-container port fee charged by port j, D (o, j) is the distance from origin
o to port j, and ϕ (·, ·) is a function of ship size and port size that is weakly decreasing in
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its second term (a larger port does not raise costs for anyone) but may be increasing in the
first term if the port is not large enough. f is the average cost of moving a container on a
ship of size So,j the distance D (o, j) with parameter(s) βsea. In estimation, I parameterize
this function based on work studying the economies of scale in ocean shipping.
1.4.4 Land carriers
Land carriers are a competitive industry with a constant marginal cost. They charge
marginal cost per unit distance βland. Thus pland,j,d = βlandD (j, d).
1.4.5 Port authorities
Port authorities play a game with each other in two stages: first, they choose whether or
not to be Big Ship Ready, ωj . Then, they set prices to maximize a weighted average of
profits and total quantity, Wj . I explain the steps in reverse order.
Stage Two
The per-period payoff is
Wj = [(pj −mcj) qj (Ω, aj , a−j , pj , p−j)] + θjqj (Ω, aj , a−j , pj , p−j) (1.3)
Port authorities choose the price pj that maximizes this value, taking as given the prices
of other ports, p−j the investment strategies, aj and a−j , and the state of other ports’
preparedness, Ω. The first term on the right-hand side is standard, these are just the profits.
The second term multiplied by θj is quantity alone, and θj is the weight port authority j
places on it. Ports are quasi-public entities, and in their public statements often claim to be
helping the entire regional economy. If they are purely profit-maximizing this term θj will
be zero, but if they consider not only their own profits but their employment of workers,
or business provided for local firms, it will be positive.5
Stage One
Taking the second stage objective functions as given, in the first stage ports decide whether
or not to invest. They trade off the cost of investing with the higher qj of more importers
going through.
5 I am agnostic about where θ comes from. One possible microfoundation is the following: the quantity
unloaded, is a linear function of labor, qj = Aj`j . Then profits will be pjqj − wAjqj , where wj is the
wage. Suppose that after choosing price, the port knows the surplus created will be bargained over, and
therefore the wage paid will be a weighted average of the workers’ outside options and the surplus wj =
(1−β)Apj +βAUj , where β is the bargaining weight and U is the outside option. Thus when choosing price
the port will internalize some of the wages, even though they appear in the financial reports as costs.
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The ports authorities solve
max
a∈{0,1}
{
W̃ (Ω, a, a−j , p̃, p−j)− 1a=1 (1− σj)Fj
}
(1.4)
where
W̃ (Ω, a, a−j , p, p−j) = max
p
W (Ω, a, a−j , p, p−j)
and p̃ = arg maxpW (Ω, a, a−j , p, p−j).
where a is the decision to invest in post-Panamax vessels, Fj is the total cost of port j
increasing capacity to post-Panamax, σ is the fraction subsidied by the Army Corps of
Engineers or some other outside authority, and a−j is the vector of investment decisions by
other ports. The decision to invest is affected by the expected difference in W but also the
amount that is subsidized. Clearly if the entire cost were subsidized, σj = 1, ports would
always invest.
This model is static; the authorities do not consider their decisions in the future. However,
the status of being Big Ship Ready is persistent. For ports which are already Big Ship
Ready entering the period, ωj = 1, I assume that Fj = 0, and so the decision is to always
“invest” for these port authorities.
1.4.6 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a vector of carrier prices, quantities, ship sizes, and investment decisions,
{(psea,o,j)o,j , (pland,j,d)j,d , (qo,j)o,j , (So,j)o,j ,~a} such that
1. Taking prices and investment decisions as given, importers solve equation (1.1).
2. Taking importer quantities and investment decisions as given, carriers solve equation
(1.2).
3. Taking ship sizes, demand, subsidies, and the investment decisions of other ports as
given, ports solve equation (1.4).
1.5 Estimation
There are three sets of parameters of interest: the economies of scale, the substitution pa-
rameters, and the port authority weight on total quantity. Identifying substitution parame-
ters requires costs that depend on economies of scale, and identifying how much authorities
weigh quantity requires understanding demand. I present how I estimate each set in this
order.
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1.5.1 Economies of Scale
Carriers that use larger vessels have a lower average cost per container, and they pass these
savings onto importers. I parameterize the average cost function as
f (So,j , D (o, j) ;βsea) = βsea × S−γo,jD (o, j)
where γ is the elasticity of average cost with respect to vessel size. Distance D (o, j) and
vessel size So,j are observed, thus I need to estimate γ and βsea.
If I could see the costs of each ship, estimating γ would be straightforward: simply regress
the logged costs on the logged size, perhaps controlling for year built and builder to account
for technological progress. Unfortunately, though I see the individual operating costs of
ports I do not have those for specific ships. Instead, I use estimates from work I have done
with Tom Holmes (Bailey and Holmes (in progress)). In that paper, we use average charter
rates published by Drewry to estimate non-fuel operating costs. For fuel costs, we predict
the power necessary to move the ship at its design speed based on its physical dimensions.
See Appendix for more details.
1.5.2 Demand
I define a market to be all ports in the United States over one calendar year. Although it is
not uncommon for carriers to add or remove routes in response to changes in demand, every
spring they decide a rough schedule based on anticipated demand and long-term contracts.
The port financial reports are issued annually, which makes price vary at the annual level.
To make ports comparable, I take averages of values within one calendar year. For example,
the Port of New York and New Jersey fiscal year starts January 1, 2015 and the Port of
Los Angeles’s starts July 1, 2015. For Los Angeles, I treat the 2015 price to be the average
of what I gather from the 2014 and 2015 annual reports. Similarly, if a dredging project is
completed, say, in October 2016, the 2016 harbor depth is reported as a weighted average
of the depth for the first 10 months and the last two.
For simplicity, the price importers pay depends only on distance, port fee, and whether a
port is “Big Ship Ready.” I define this last characteristic as an indicator for whether a port
has a maximum berth depth greater than 45 feet and an air draft above 185 feet. I could
interact it with ship size in a binary way, where the ship variable is 1 if post-Panamax
and 0 if smaller. Because there is not a strict cutoff, I use a continuous interaction instead.
Another possibility would be to estimate this expression and simply remove from the“small”
ports from the choice set of larger ships. This would effectively be using a binary variable
and taking βBSR → ∞. However, even ports that are not technically prepared for post-
Panamax ships can take them in under special (expensive) conditions. (See the Data section
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for an example with the Mediterranean Shipping Company and Port of Savannah.) Thus
including all ports in the choice set of all vessels and allowing βBSR to be a large but finite
value is a better approximation than imposing a sharp cutoff.
Shipments with ports of entry in cities different than the port of unlading must go through
Customs twice. There is likely a fixed cost associated with these ports differing, on top of
the additional distance. I include an indicator for ports of unlading and entry differing to
account for this cost.
Importer i’s utility from going to port j is
Uij = −α
(
βsea ×
(
S
−1
3
oi,j
D (oi, j)
)
+ pj + βlandD (j, di) + βBSR1BSRSoi,j
)
+ ξj + εij
The importer is concerned only with the prices paid to the ocean and land carriers and
the “port quality” ξj , which is further split into a time-varying component ξ̃jt and a fixed
component ξj . (I drop the t in the rest of the equations to reduce notation and because
ξj is the only place where it matters.) I do not observe these prices, though I do observe
cost components like distance, ship size, and port amenities. I use variation between the
importers and the Panama Canal constraint to identify importer-specific components like
distance, and information on port operating expenses to identify the effect of prices.
I follow (Goolsbee and Petrin (2004)) to estimate demand. I use maximum likelihood to
estimate the parameters for importer-level characteristics, like land and ocean distance, and
then an instrumental variable regression to estimate the parameters for port-level charac-
teristics, like price and the unobserved quality. First, note that the importer utility can be
rewritten as
Uij = δj − α
(
βsea ×
(
S
−1
3
oi,j
D (oi, j)
)
+ βlandD (j, di) + βBSR1BSRSoi,j
)
+ εij
where δj = −αpj + ξj . The location of importers and where they are importing from
is random and exogenous, so there are importers who are the same but for distance to
ports, the same but for distance from foreign port to port, etc. This variation allows me
to identify α × βsea, α × βland α × βBSR, and δj with maximum likelihood estimation. If
there were no unobserved product characteristic common to all consumers, variation from
the consumers would be enough to identify the price elasticity. However, there are likely
quality difference between ports that I do not capture with just my measures of distance
and capacity. For example, some ports may have faster turnaround times, or refueling may
be cheaper. Price is likely to be correlated with these unobserved qualities. I instrument
price with the average operating expense per container. This gives me α alone, and from
this I can separate the other variables estimated with maximum likelihood.
Importer i takes as given the size of the ship going from the foreign port to port j, Soi,j .
However, the size is the result of decisions made importer i as well as all of the other
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importers, and I therefore cannot assume that for a port j′ that i decides to not choose,
Soi,j′ = Soi,j . To account for these differences, I nonparametrically predict
6 the size of
the vessel as a function of:
 Big Ship Ready status
 total number of containers moving from a given foreign region to that port (including
the container of the importer in question)
 the ocean carrier hired by the importer
and use these predicted values for the sizes the importer faces at each port.
Assuming the idiosyncratic term follows a Type I extreme value distribution, the probability
of importer i importing a good from o to d going to port j is
Piodj =
e
δj−α
(
βsea×
(
S
−1
3
oi,j
D(oi,j)
)
+βlandD(j,d)+βBSR1BSRSoi,j
)
1 +
∑
k∈J e
δk−α
(
βsea×
(
S
−1
3
oi,k
D(oi,k)
)
+βlandD(k,di)+βBSR1BSRSoi,k
) (1.5)
and the share of containers going to j is
sj =
∫
Piodjφ(i, o, d)didodd
where φ(i, o, d) is the probability density of importers of type i importing from o to d.
1.5.3 Port Authority Objectives
Recall that ports maximize a weighted average of profits and quantity,
[(pj −mcj) qj (Ω, a, a−j , pj , p−j)] + θqj (Ω, a, a−j , pj , p−j)− 1aj (1− σj)Fj
Let âj be the action port j does not take. Clearly W (aj) − 1aj (1− σj)Fj ≥ W (âj) −
1âj (1− σj)Fj , or, rearranging,
θj ≥
(1− σj)Fj − [(p− c) q − (p̂− ĉ) q̂]
q − q̂
(1.6)
if aj = 1 and q > q̂ and
θj ≤
(1− σ̂j) F̂j + [(p̂− ĉ) q̂ − (p− c) q]
q̂ − q
(1.7)
if aj = 0 and q < q̂.
6 Specifically, I use a random forest algorithm. This technique creates decision trees for many random
samples of the data and averages over all of the trees’ predictions.
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I assume that θ = θj , ∀j. Then for the nine ports on the East Coast that were not already
Big Ship Ready, I have a system of inequalities that allows me to bound θ.
I assume there is a single θ but allow Fj to vary across ports. (I do assume Fj = F̂j , that
is, the “hypothetical” cost is the same as if the cost were realized.) Unfortunately, the only
ports I see during this period to finish their Big Ship Ready projects are Miami, Houston,
and New York & New Jersey. I use the actual costs for their values of Fj . I also see the
projected costs of Savannah, Charleston, and Port Everglades. By the time of writing these
projects are closer to completion, so the most recent projected costs are likely the actual
ones. For the other four ports on the East Coast I do not observe investment costs and
thus do not include them in the estimation. (I do observe physical characteristics and could
potentially predict costs, but this would require additional modeling.)
For estimation I allow there to be an additional error term on the right hand sides of
equations 1.6 and 1.7. This encompasses measurement error. We may worry there is an
unobserved cost component, say ζj . In that case a port will not invest if
[(p̂j − ĉj) q̂j ] + θq̂j − (1− σj)Fj − ζj ≤ [(pj − cj) qj ] + θqj
⇒ θ + ζj
q̂j − qj
≤ (1− σ̂j) F̂j + [(p̂− ĉ) q̂ − (p− c) q]
q̂ − q
and a parallel expression holds if it does invest. Unfortunately there is not a straightforward
way to identify both θ and ζj without additional assumptions. One potential assumption
would be that ζj varies across ports but is constant over time and use the panel aspect of
the data. I leave this for future work.
Timing and Dynamics
Though the model abstracts from dynamics, we still need to consider authorities’ discount-
ing and expectations to make the payoff Wj (a flow) and cost Fj (a lump sum possibly
amortized over several years) comparable. There are a few possible sources for the discount
rate. One is the rate the port authorities face in the financial markets: all of these ports sell
millions of dollars worth of bonds in liquid bond markets, so we can look at the rates they
face there to get a sense of what the an annualized Fj amounts to. These rates vary between
around 3-7% across and within ports, with a mode around 5%. There are also standard
numbers used by federal agencies in conducting cost-benefit analysis. The Army Corps
of Engineers uses a value based on the average yield of long-term Treasury securitities; in
2016 this was 3.125%. Other agencies use different numbers: the Office of Management and
Budget has used 7% since 1992 (Army Corps of Engineers (2007)).
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For my baseline, I use 5%. This number is the one most tightly linked to prices the individual
ports face, and is also in the middle of the 3.125-7% range.
More generally the model is potentially misspecified because it ignores dynamics. For
example, I implicitly assume the total number of imports is stationary, but if port authorities
expect international trade to grow, I could be measuring as a high value of θ what is really
future expected profits.7 I check the robustness of my results by studying counterfactuals
with the measured θ and with θ = 0, i.e. when they are profit-maximizing.8
1.6 Data
1.6.1 Port characteristics
Data on port characteristics come from port authority financial reports and various news
sources. The physical characteristics I focus on are harbor depth and, if applicable, the air
draft or height limit due to bridges. There are other forms of capital ports invest in such
as rail connections or warehouse areas, but these two are especially important as they limit
the maximum ship size. There is a rarely a hard cap, but something like a shallow harbor
depth can make it more costly for a carrier to enter with a larger vessel. For example, in
2006, the carrier MSC started sending 6,700 TEU vessels to the Port of Savannah. The
draft of these vessels when fully loaded was 48 feet, more than Savannah’s harbor, so MSC
was obliged to send vessels that were less than fully loaded. This either meant a more
complicated scheduling problem or losing some of the economies of scale advantages of a
larger ship. They also required high tide and thus could only enter during specific times of
day. Eventually, this proved too cumbersome, and MSC switched to sending many of the
larger vessels to Charleston, with goods intended for the Savannah market trucked down
(Army Corps of Engineers (2012)).
In Table 1.1 are the range and median ports depths on each coast. During this period,
most of the growth was from the East Coast expanding to the same depths as West Coast
ports. West Coast harbors are for the most part naturally deeper. There is also no canal
constraining ship sizes from East Asia to the West Coast, and so most had already adopted
to larger ship sizes by this time.
Table 1.2 shows the level of investment at some of the ports on the East Coast. These
investments vary in size, but all involve dredging or raising bridges so that the new ships
going through the Panama Canal can berth. I consider a port to be “Big Ship Ready” if
7 In a 2012 study, the Army Corps of Engineers used predictions from IHS Global Insight of 5.2% per
year for the next thirty years.
8 Although it is unlikely the ports truly expected stationary demand, the data alone suggest it would
not be an outrageous assumption. From external sources, the growth rate of total container imports was
only 1.5% per year from 2007 to 2017 (versus 0% implicity assumed here).
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East Coast West Coast
Max Median Max Median
2014 50 43 53 51
2015 50 44 53 51
2016 51 45 53 51
2017 55 45 53 51
2018 55 45 53 51
Table 1.1: Maximum Berth Depth (ft.)
Start Year End Year Cost Port Share
Miami 2013 2015 $220 mil. 49%
Savannah 2015 2022 $973 mil. 25%
NY & NJ 2015 2017 $1.68 bil. 100%
Charleston 2018 2021 $558 mil. 36%
Port Everglades 2020 2022-2025 $389 mil. 49%
Houston 2018 ongoing $1 bil. 35%
Table 1.2: Selected investments in post-Panamax readiness
it has at least one berth with depths exceeding 45 feet and air drafts below 185 feet. The
actual depths of even vessels of the same capacity varies, but 45 feet can accommodate ships
with capacities below the pre-expansion Canal and many sizes above it. From 2014-2018,
Miami, Houston, and New York & New Jersey all became ready under the definition that
their harbor depths exceeded this depth. (Houston was already close to 45 feet and thus
became ready early on in the construction.) Norfolk already met this criterion entering the
period. However, all ports but Boston and Wilmington, North Carolina began at least the
initial phases of expanding and so I consider all but those two to have made the investment
decision in the counterfactuals. For ports for which I do not have investment cost data, I
assume their cost would be the average of the observed ($690 million) and they would pay
one third of this ($230 million).
Prices are another important characteristic. Port authorities are legally required to release
general schedules of tariffs outlining every possible fee they may charge carriers. These
published tariffs are only upper bounds, though, and in practice ports change them in-
frequently. As mentioned above, most of ports’ container revenues come from wharfage,
a per-container fee. (Over 90% of container revenues for Port of Los Angeles were from
wharfage.) I therefore derive unit price by dividing container revenue by the total quantity
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Figure 1.1: Map of ports in sample
of containers9
Perhaps the most important feature of ports is one over which the authorities have no
control: where the port is physically located. Figure 1.1 shows the map of the ports that I
consider in my market. There are two things to notice. First and most obviously, the North
American landmass separates ports on the East and West Coast. Carriers going from East
Asia to the East Coast must decide whether to unload on the West Coast and ship by land
or go through the Canal, subject to the constraints that imposes. Second, ports are not
distributed uniformly. The East Coast is more densely filled than the West. There are also
many “twins,” ports that are separate but very close to one another, like Los Angeles and
Long Beach, Seattle and Tacoma, or Miami and Port Everglades. These facts suggest that
substitution patterns likely vary across ports.
1.6.2 Container imports
All imports to the United States file a bill of ladings with United States Customs and Border
Protection (CBP).10 These contain the date entering the U.S., the vessel the shipment
9 The total quantity here refers to imports and exports. I do not study exports in the rest of the chapter
but ignoring them here would cause me to overshoot the average price charged.
10 I thank Tom Holmes for providing these bill of ladings data.
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came on, the foreign port it came from, the U.S. port it entered, and the U.S. customs
office it went through. These last two variables, the “port of unlading” and “port of entry,”
respectively, are important in proxying for the land distance traveled. Each observation
is at the level of a shipment, which normally consists of all the goods of a certain type a
specific importer is ordering on a single voyage. Very often a “shipment” and a “container”
are the same and in the model and rest of this chapter I use the terms interchangeably.11
I merge these bill of ladings data with vessel characteristics and port characteristics. For ves-
sels the most important characteristic is ship size. I use the vessel names and International
Maritime Organization (IMO) number (an identifier that never changes over the ship’s life)
to add the total container capacity taken from http://www.vesseltracking.net. I also
add the port characteristics described above. Finally I calculate the distance traveled on
both legs of the journey, as I describe below.
The purpose of the shipping industry is to turn goods that are far away into goods that
are nearby, and so it is critical that the distances I use are realistic. Land distances are
the fastest route by car using the Google Maps API. For the sea distances, I use publicly
available data on the actual travel distance between ports from https://sea-distances.
org. For ships that could go through the old Panama Canal, or “Panamax sized ships,” I
assume they always take the shortest path, which may or may not go through the Panama
Canal. For ships larger, called“post-Panamax,” if they are also under 13,000 TEU, I assume
they take the shortest non-Panama distance before the canal expanded and the shortest
distance, including Panama, afterwards. For ships larger than 13,000 TEU, I assume they
always take the shortest non-Panama distance.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 display the average distances traveled by land for containers and sea,
respectively. The majority of containers go through customs in the same port as their ship
arrives, so the median distance traveled on land is zero. To give a sense of what these
distances refer to, 2,211 km is the distance between Los Angeles and Houston. For sea,
10,601 km is the distance between Yantian (a district in Shenzhen in southern China) and
Los Angeles. Over this entire period, the distance between the port of unlading and the final
destination is falling. The sea distances are growing before 2016, when they fall, but they
begin growing in 2018 again. This drop is likely due to containers that might previously
have gone on large vessels through Suez instead going through Panama. Over time, the
average importer is preferring ports that are closer by land at the expense of sea.
If importers are preferring longer sea travel, it must be because sea travel is becoming
cheaper relative to land. In Table 1.5, we see that the size of vessels has been growing over
11 To account for shipments that are smaller or larger than a single container, in estimation I weigh all
observations by the number of containers. This implies that if an importer orders, say, six containers of
home goods, the idiosyncratic cost shock εij is the same for all six containers.
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Year Mean Median Mean (>0) Median (>0)
2014 462 0 1,994 2,211
2015 414 0 1,936 2,193
2016 391 0 1,894 2,192
2017 371 0 1,816 1,990
2018 367 0 1,795 1,990
Table 1.3: Land distances from port j to destination d (km)
Year Mean Median
2014 12,166 10,571
2015 12,459 10,660
2016 12,300 10,601
2017 12,207 10,601
2018 12,334 10,601
Table 1.4: Sea distances from foreign origin o to port j (km)
time. Given the economies of scale in shipping, this leg of the journey has become cheaper.
Year Mean Median
2014 6,465 6,350
2015 6,796 6,600
2016 7,061 6,763
2017 7,504 7,500
2018 7,728 8,000
Table 1.5: Vessel size (twenty-foot units)
1.6.3 Summary
Table 1.6 shows the variables used in the estimation of scale economies, demand estima-
tion, and the weight ports put on quantity. I estimate the values in that order, using scale
economies parameters as part of the demand estimation, and then using the substitution
parameters from demand estimation to simulate market shares under counterfactual scenar-
ios. The differences between simulated and realized profits allow me to bound the weight
the authorities put on quantity outside of profit.
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Variable Source
Scale economies
Charter rates ($) Drewry
Fuel costs ($) West Texas Intermediate
Demand estimation
Port choice US Customs Bill of Ladings
Ocean distance (km) www.sea-distances.org
Land distance (km) Google Maps API
Port fee ($) Container revenuesContainer quantity from port annual financial reports
Ship size (TEU) www.vesseltracking.net
Big Ship Ready ({0, 1}) Port websites, ACE reports, news reports
Port objective
Expansion costs ($) Port websites, ACE reports, news reports
Marginal costs ($) Waterfront Commission of New York
Port profits ($) Port annual financial reports
Table 1.6: Variables Used
1.7 Results
1.7.1 Economies of scale
In Table 1.7 I compare my results to past papers.12 These authors use different data
sources: (Jansson and Shneerson (1978)) use data from Zim and the port of Haifa in the
early 1960s; (Cullinane and Khanna (1999)) use the Fairplay dataset of vessels from the
mid-1990s. Nevertheless, the results are fairly consistent across studies. Cullinane and
Khanna’s elasticity for fuel is an exception: this may be because they assume design speed
increases linearly with the size of the vessel. I use the stated design speed and get results
much closer to Jansson and Shneerson, who use actual fuel cost data. My total cost elasticity
is 0.28. It is not clear what the “total cost” elasticities from the other papers are, though
based on the fuel and non-fuel elasticities of Jansson and Shneerson, theirs is slightly higher
than mine. In the work that follows I use γ = 0.28, but values do not change much moving
it from 0.20 to 0.35.
Jansson and Shneerson (1978) 0.28 (fuel), 0.4 (capital), 0.6 (non-fuel)
Cullinane and Khanna (1999) 0.03 (fuel), 0.24 (capital)
Author’s estimates 0.23 (fuel), 0.27 (capital), 0.52 (non-fuel), 0.28 (total)
Table 1.7: Average cost elasticities
12 Although I do not use the “capital” elasticity in my estimation, I include it here to show the results
are in line with past work.
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Figure 1.2: Model Fit
1.7.2 Demand
The model fits the data reasonably well. In Figure 1.2, I plot the predicted market share
for shipments going to Chicago against the data. I choose Chicago as it is an interior
destination geographically closer to the East Coast, but which traditionally sent most of
its goods through the West Coast ports. the The model predicts some of the largest ports
should be even larger, but is still very close. In Figure 1.3, I aggregate the shares of all East
Coast ports and plot that against the actual share. Besides the first year, these shares are
also very close.
Table 1.8 shows the demand coefficients estimated. Recall that the coefficients on land
distance, sea distance, and whether or not the port can take larger ships show how those
variables affect price, not the consumer’s utility directly. For that, we would need to
multiply them by the price coefficient. E.g., when a consumer is one kilometer farther, his
utility increases by α × βland × 1 = −0.00116. In dollar terms we can look at βland alone,
so an additional kilometer is about one cent.
It is useful to compare these cost parameters with realistically sized ships. The sea“distance”
is scaled down with larger ships to capture economies of scale. Similarly, βBSR is scaled
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Figure 1.3: Model Fit
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up. For a 5,000 TEU ship, distance is multiplied by around 0.09. Thus the cost of shipping
by land is about 13 times as expensive as shipping the same container by sea on a 5,000
TEU ship. For larger vessels the difference is even larger. This fits the pattern in the
data of importers closer to East Coast ports choosing to use them as the ship size grows,
to minimize the total land distance. At the same time, we see that for the same ship,
βBSR × 5000 ≈ 176, 400, many orders of magnitude greater than the cost of travel. Why
are there not enormous swings in shares when ports becomes Big Ship Ready, then? In
Table 1.9 I show some of the time-constant quality effects for each port. These are large in
magnitude and they are disparate. Even if a port does not expand, importers persistently
value it for other reasons of unobserved quality.
α −0.0720
(∗)
βland 0.111(
1.14× 10−5
)
βsea 0.0168(
2.10× 10−5
)
βBSR −4.04
(0.00460)
fdi 6= j 6.430
(0.0453)
N 64,020
Table 1.8: Demand parameters
* The objects being regressed in the second stage are themselves estimators. Calculating the standard
errors by bootstrapping takes multiple weeks.
In Table 1.10, I present demand elasticities for select ports over this period. I also include
the own-elasticity with respect to sea distance. The demand elasticity for sea “distance”
also shows what would happen with different sized vessels. For example, plugging in a
5% increase in the size of ships would lead to about a 0.9% increase in Norfolk’s 2016
market share. These elasticities are small compared to price and to land. This fits with the
findings above that land costs are much higher than sea. Whereas adding or subtracting
a few hundred kilometers to the ocean voyage will not have have a large effect on shares,
doing the same for land leads to dramatic shifts.
This is further evident in the diversion ratios. Table 1.11 shows the diversion ratios for a
sample of ports. These are the ratios if ports in the columns raise their price. For example,
if Norfolk raises its price 1%, 33.2% will go to New York and 8.51% will go to Los Angeles.
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Port ξj
25th percentile -12.224
50th percentile 0.05178
75th percentile 5.660
Los Angeles -12.197
Long Beach -12.486
New York 1.0608
Norfolk -5.399
Houston 4.663
Table 1.9: Port-level fixed effects
Port Price Sea Distance Land Distance
25th percentile -8.313 -1.262 -3.112
50th percentile -3.111 -1.103 -2.086
75th percentile -2.421 -0.928 -1.793
New York, 2016 -3.141 -1.174 -1.828
Norfolk, 2016 -11.969 -1.175 -1.175
Houston, 2016 -8.912 -1.312 -1.964
Table 1.10: Own elasticities for selected ports
It is easy to see how both economies of scale and location affect substitution. Los Angeles
and Long Beach are larger than New York, but Boston is so much closer to New York than
those two that if it were to raise prices, twice as much would be diverted there rather than
the two West Coast ports. Conversely, even though Boston is much nearer Norfolk than
Seattle is, there are enough economies of scale from Seattle’s size that slightly more traffic
is diverted from Norfolk to Seattle than Norfolk to Boston.
1.7.3 Port Authority Objective
Because there are only six moment inequalities, I present them all in Table 1.12 I include the
bounds calculated when ports were making decisions in 2017, after the Canal had expanded.
I do not observe the investment costs for ports that did not invest, so I can only show lower
bounds. The discount rate assumed here is 5%. Using 3.125% or 7% makes very little
difference. Miami was the only port to have invested in 2016, but New York and Houston
were finished one and two years later, respectively, and the other ports had all announced
their plans to expand by this point.
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Boston New York Norfolk Houston Los Angeles Long Beach Seattle
Boston - 2.10 1.11 0.0611 0.248 0.225 0.229
New York 35.8 - 33.2 3.77 7.44 7.27 6.22
Norfolk 8.36 14.7 - 2.01 2.48 2.36 2.01
Houston 0.214 0.774 0.933 - 3.98 4.17 1.20
Los Angeles 6.43 11.3 8.51 29.5 - 36.2 23.7
Long Beach 6.02 11.4 8.34 31.8 37.3 - 25.8
Seattle 1.10 1.75 1.28 1.65 4.38 4.64 -
Table 1.11: Diversion ratios (%), 2014
Port Lower Bound
Miami -105
Houston 290
Port Everglades 106
Savannah 72.5
Charleston 189
NY & NJ 34.1
Table 1.12: Bounds for θ
The lower bounds vary dramatically. The median price-cost margin in 2017 was about $45,
so the lower bounds go from a little under this to over 1,400 times as much. The latter
value is frankly unbelievable, and is likely a result of the sample being limited to importers
in the interior. The fraction of containers with final destination different from the port
of unlading is very small for Miami and Port Everglades, 3.4 and 7 percent, respectively,
compared to 14.2 percent of containers going to New York & New Jersey or 24 percent for
Norfolk. In considering counterfactual revenues and profits I rescale my sample to match
the actual total, but ports that have a smaller than average fraction of interior customers
will have smaller than actual rescaled revenues. I should emphasize here that the demand
estimates are still consistent because the importers are selected on exogenous characteristics.
However, there are masses of consumers at each port that likely act differently than interior
importers, and it is difficult to say how those affect revenues.
1.8 Counterfactuals
In this section, I imagine there is a centralized East Coast port authority. I first show the
extreme cases where there is zero investment and when all the ports invest. The first-order
results are not surprising: there would be fewer imports to the East if no one invested and
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more if everyone did. However, in the world with no investment, East Coast imports fall
more than West Coast imports rise. Similarly when everyone on the East invests, imports
there rise more than West Coast fall. This suggests that even with the Canal expansion,
the two coasts are very imperfect substitutes, and that the East Coast is mostly drawing
imports from (or losing them to) the outside good.
More interestingly, I compare the surplus from the actual investment to what might have
occurred with coordination. I show the pattern for θ = 0 (port authorities are profit
maximizing) and θ = 300, as suggested by the bounds I estimate above.13 I also study
what they would do if they were not subsidized. All scenarios produce results very different
from what actually happened. In most, ports working as a single authority would have
done better if they had not invested in the Port of New York and New Jersey. In the case
where ports are not profit-maximizing and they are not subsidized, they would have chosen
to not invest in Houston. These choices align with the ones a social planner considering
importer surplus would make.
Predicting counterfactual market shares requires predicting the counterfactual ship sizes,
which depend in part on qo,j , the quantity of containers going from a foreign port to a
domestic one. This of course depends on the counterfactual demand, which is the quantity
I’m trying to simulate. I predict ship sizes with a reduce-form model that predicts size
based on year, foreign origin, carrier, and importantly, qo,j and whether the port can take
in large ships. I estimate the policy functions for pj in a similar way, as a reduced-form
function of investment and demand. These predicted values are used to estimate market
shares, which generate new values for qo,j . I use these new values to predict new ship sizes,
and repeat the process until the qo,j vectors converge.
For the sake of consistency the “Actual” values in the graphs are the model fitted values,
not the raw data.
1.8.1 No investment
In 2014, all ports on the West Coast and Norfolk on the East Coast were “Big Ship Ready.”
By the end of my period in mid-2018, three more on the East Coast had been added:
Port of New York and New Jersey, Houston, and Miami.14 In the first counterfactual,
I simulate market shares when the centralized authority decides to have no investments,
all ports stay as they were in 2014. The results for the East Coast are shown in Figure
13 For the investment costs, I use the actual costs for the ports for which I have data. For the ports
with missing data, I assume they have costs that are the average of the observed. Results do not differ if I
assume they have the lowest costs on record; though there are some changes if I assume they all have the
highest costs on record.
14 Not included in my sample are the Port of Philadelphia, which dredged its main shipping channel to
45 feet in 2017, and Port of Baltimore, which was already 50 feet in 2014. Each of these had 1.80% market
share in 2018.
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1.4. Without investment, the major East Coast ports are unable to take advantage of the
expanded canal. The West Coast share in Figure 1.5 is higher, but less than the decrease
in the East Coast.
Figure 1.4: East Coast shares when no East Coast ports invest
1.8.2 All invest
In this counterfactual, I consider the outcome where all ports on the East Coast become
ready for larger vessels by 2017 at the latest. (Ports that were ready by 2017 are still ready
earlier.) Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show the effects in the East and West, respectively. There is a
large increase in 2017, though by 2018 the East Coast share is only about 6% higher than
it would be otherwise. The West Coast 2018 share difference is smaller, about 4% below its
actual value. Just as in the scenario with less investment, the traffic lost does not all go to
the West Coast, in this scenario where there’s more investment, not all the traffic gained
comes at the expense of the West.
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Figure 1.5: West Coast shares when no East Coast ports invest
1.8.3 Investment under a single authority
Suppose now that the East Coast ports wish to choose the investment that maximizes
their total surplus. From my estimated bounds, 300 is a plausible value for θ, and so for
this counterfactual I assume that port authorities value each container as worth $300, on
top of their unit profit. To show the importance of considering the non-profit maximizing
motives of the authorities, I also show results from θ = 0, that is, when port authorities act
as normal profit-maximizing firms. The results are in Table 1.13. The table shows port,
importer, and total surplus, as well as the port that the centralized authority would not
invest in (not counting Boston and Wilmington). The table does not show the welfare of
the outside government providing the subsidy.
If ports are subsidized and value containers separately from profit, total surplus is $1.2
billion higher when they do not invest in the Port of New York and New Jersey. If they
are solely profit maximizing the difference is even greater, $1.5 billion. The importers’
consumer surplus is about $22 million when all but Boston and Wilmington invest and is
increasing with greater investment, so the savings to the ports alone is even higher. For
comparison, in 2017 the ports in the East Coast sample earned about $1.3 billion in revenue
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Figure 1.6: East Coast shares when all East Coast ports invest
from importing 11 million containers (plus exporting a slightly lower number). The social
welfare loss is therefore almost the equivalent of one year’s total revenue. It is important
to note these investment patterns are not necessarily the true optimum. Finding that
would require resolving the equilibrium for each of the 512 possible combinations, which is
computationally slow. However, even considering slight deviations from what ports actually
did, we see that there are large savings.
It may be surprising that the ports dropped from investing are ones as large as New York or
Houston. There are two forces pushing towards these as the ones to not bother expanding.
First, the investment costs for these ports were higher than the others, and in the case of
New York, all of this cost was borne by the port authority itself.15 Second, these ports
were already desirable to importers for other reasons. Looking at Table 1.9, both have
better than median quality fixed effects. “Port quality” and expansion act as substitutes,
to some degree.
Subsidization mechanically affects the total cost of the ports, but it only affects the decision
15 New York has received federal assistance in the past for dredging projects, but the Bayonne Bridge
raising was self-funded.
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Figure 1.7: West Coast shares when all East Coast ports invest
in the case when ports are profit-maximizing. This makes sense if we consider why a subsidy
may exist in the first place: the federal and state governments believe there are benefits
from improved trade infrastructure that the port authority cannot charge for, and thus
they want to encourage these positive spillovers. However, θ greater than zero implies the
authorities are already aware of some of these spillovers and value them in their decision
making. Even if the authorities cannot capture the externality through increased revenue,
they value it for its own sake.
Finally, in Table 1.14 I show the individual payoffs for New York under the realized outcome
(when almost all ports invested) compared to the “optimal16 ” scenarios where New York
does not. In the baseline scenario, when θ = 300, New York does better when it chooses
to invest if everyone else is, $397 million versus $165 million. Even though the raising
the bridge was incredibly expensive, over $1.7 billion, it is worth it to New York if almost
everyone else is investing. Thus, there is a “race to the bottom” where individual ports find
16 I put “optimal” in scare quotes because, though it does happen that this single port authority solution
is optimal, there is no theoretical reason why that need to be the case. It is possible that under a different
specification, say if the investment decision were continuous rather than binary, the single authority solution
would not maximize total surplus.
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Subsidized Unsubsidized
θ = 300 θ = 0 θ = 300 θ = 0
Not investing in... NY & NJ NY & NJ NY & NJ Houston
Total port welfare ($ mil.) 1,481 -774 -2,649 -5,066
East Coast CS ($ mil.) 19 19 19 21
Total surplus ($ mil.) 1,500 -755 -2,630 -5,045
Actual surplus ($ mil.) 306 -2,239 -3,387 -5,932
Table 1.13: Investment Decisions Under East Coast Authority
Subsidized
θ = 300 θ = 0
NY & NJ
Doesn’t invest 165 20
Invests 397 -789
Table 1.14: Individual Payoffs of New York under “Optimal” Equilibria ($ mil.)
it in their interest to overinvest, even as total surplus falls.
Robustness
Whether or not a port (or coalition of ports) has an incentive to invest is clearly highly
dependent on the value of θ. The selection of 300 is reasonable given the governance of the
ports and the data observed, but it remains true that the sample size for choosing it is very
small. In Figure 1.8, I plot the “best choices” for the Port of New York and New Jersey,
the collaborating East Coast, and the collaborating East Coast without any state or federal
subsidies. A value of zero means the entity should not invest, one means it should. In the
extreme, a very high value of θ implies as many people as possible should invest. In the
graph we see that it is in the best interest of New York and also the East Coast coalition for
it to invest if θ is over $870. Similarly, if θ is very low, it is in neither’s interest to invest. In
between, though, from about $210 to $870, is an intermediate range where the incentives
are misaligned. My chosen value of 300 falls in this range, but so do many others, and the
fundamental result stays the same.
Figure 1.8 also partially answers a question I do not directly address in this chapter: how
much of the overinvestment is due to competition and how much is due to the subsidies. The
individual best choice for New York is far from the East Coast solution with subsidies, but
much closer when there are none. They are still different, to be clear: these best response
functions are not probabilistic objects and so there is not chance they are the same line. If
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we think of distance to the optimal allocation as the level of taxes or subsidies necessary
to adjust individual behavior, the tax on investment for New York is much smaller when
there are not subsidies than when there are.
Figure 1.8: Incentives for NY & NJ, all East Coast, and all East Coast w/out subsidy to
invest
1.9 Conclusion
Most infrastructure investment is not done by the US national government but smaller
political units. However, the effects of this investment are often national in scope. Though
competition can have many beneficial effects, such as increased variety, if these units act
strategically there may be negative externalities that could be better internalized by a
centralized authority.
I have looked at the case of container ports in the US in the period leading up to and
right after the Panama Canal expanding. The expansion pushed many ports on the East to
invest in larger harbors so they could take full advantage of the larger ships. If their business
expanded only at the expense of already large ports, the social cost of the investments would
not necessarily exceed the benefits. As it turns out, most of the new business came not
from the already large West Coast ports but the smaller fringe, ports that show up as my
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outside good. The total level of investment may be close to optimal. However, on the East
Coast there are clear benefits of coordination, both for the port authorities and society at
large. If the port authorities were to coordinate their decisions, they would produce results
better for them and better for total social surplus by avoiding expensive investments that
do not sufficiently raise the coastwide market share. Subsidies could potentially solve this
issue, but as they are currently used appear to be too indiscriminate. If the Army Corps
of Engineers plans to continue subsidizing under the same guidelines it currently uses,
encouraging ports to coordinate could be one way to produce savings for both the ports
and the federal government without too greatly decreasing surplus for importers.
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Chapter 2
Work Rules and Port Productivity
2.1 Introduction
Union supporters and opponents alike agree their effects go far beyond wages. The work
rules governing what workers and employers can and cannot do are often just as contentious
as the pay itself, if not more. Freeman and Medoff (1984) famously argued this could benefit
productivity, as giving workers a voice offers an alternative to leaving a disappointing
firm, preventing costly turnover. However, there is also evidence that these rules may be
an inefficient way of splitting rents and their removal can lead to lower prices and more
productive firms Schmitz (2005).
This chapter studies a very particular change in work rules and how the industry’s produc-
tivity was affected. In 2008, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU)
agreed to a contract that allowed all ports on the West Coast of the United States to
fully automate, even knowing that automated terminals would lead to lower labor demand.
Given the union’s historical behavior, there is good reason to think employers would not
have been able to automate without this provision. Though I am studying a particular con-
tract in a particular industry, the question the provision addresses–what kinds of machinery
a firm can invest in, and what happens to workers it may displace–exists across almost all
industries and has been a cause of dispute since at least the Industrial Revolution.
I measure the impact in two ways: first, I do a simple event study comparing the average
number of worker-hours necessary to unload a ship after the contract was signed. It takes
about 25% less worker-hours to unload a vessel after the new contract than before, with the
difference coming roughly equally from fewer workers and from fewer hours spent working.
This difference decreases after the 2015 contract, though productivity remains higher than
it was before 2008. This is a little surprising just looking at the words of the 2015 contract,
but I discuss how the change may reflect a more aggressive attitude taken by the ILWU, as
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signaled by the slowdown leading up to the contract.
A weakness of the previous approach is there may of course be a time trend unrelated to the
contract. Including a linear time trend mitigates the issue but does not eliminate it. Because
the union contract (by construction) covers the entire West Coast, I cannot find any nearby
ports unaffected. I can, however, study what happens to the port of Long Beach when it
actually built an automated terminal in April 2016. I estimate a difference-in-difference and
find that the differential impact of Long Beach having an automated terminal was about
15% less worker-hours. Before automation, Long Beach actually used slightly more labor
than average. After the new terminal was built it used less than average. It is worth noting
that the differential effect of automation need not be the same as the coast-wide effect
of the new contract, but the fact that both are qualitatively and quantitatively similar is
reassuring.
The union contract was not the only change during this period: the average ship in my sam-
ple grew from a little under 45,000 gross tons to over 60,000, over 33% growth. Larger ships
can carry more goods but also take longer to unload. The additional cargo and additional
time do not necessarily grow at the same rate. If they do not, then the aggregate labor
productivity (coast-wide containers over coast-wide worker-hours) will be biased because
it fails to account for changes in inputs. In my data I observe work times for individual
ship dockings. Though results with the aggregate and granular data are qualitatively the
same direction, I show that having this fine data is necessary for quantitatively measuring
productivity over time.
This chapter follows two major strands of the literature. The first studies how unions
and work rules affect productivity. Two papers in particular are closely related to mine.
Benjamin Bridgman studies how longshore unions limited productivity growth from con-
tainerization Bridgman (2018). Even though labor productivity increased, total labor costs
fell by much less until much later on. Rather than study how a union reacts to technological
change, I am measuring the effects of a change in the work rules themselves. In his study
of US and Canadian iron ore mines, James Schmitz finds productivity increased and prices
fell Schmitz (2005). He concludes that the threat of competition forced firms and unions
to redo work rules that had been sharing profits at the cost of efficiency. There are some
interesting similarities between West Coast ports and US and Canadian iron ore mining.
Negotiations for the previous contract had been contentious, leading up to a ten day lock-
out in 2002. Ocean carriers and other logistics firms started to explore alternatives to West
Coast ports. Additionally, in 2006 the Panamanian government had announced it would
expand the Panama Canal by 20141 , making the East Coast ports a better substitute.
The second strand studies how measured productivity may differ depending on the level of
1 The actual end date was in July 2016.
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aggregation. Basu and Fernald (2002) outline a general theory of the differences between
measured aggregate productivity and pure technological change. An early empirical paper
in this literature, Griliches (1963) studies how changes in input quality and economies of
scale may bias results. The studies usually emphasize how firm-level production parameters
need not be identical to aggregate parameters because of between-firm reallocation. I am
saying little about interactions between firms (or ports, in this case) and focusing more
on issues of aggregation within a firm. In particular, how changes in the quality of what
is essentially an intermediate product, ships, can affect the measured productivity if not
accounted for.
2.2 Background
Since it began in the 1930s, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU)
has been one of the most powerful labor unions in the United States. It has been able to
guarantee high wages for its workers (average full-time salaries are over $180,000), but in
this chapter I focus on its jurisdiction over what investments are allowed in its work spaces.
Part of the union’s success comes from its measured approach to new technology. When
containerization began in earnest in the 1960s, the union did not oppose the changes, but
bargained such that existing members would continue to receive benefits and pensions even
as the demand for their labor decreased. (The fact that port labor costs did not fall is the
main reason Bridgman argues containerization did not lower trade costs until years after it
began.) It has continued that tradition more recently. In the 2008 contract, in exchange for
$800 million in wages and pensions, the ILWU agreed to include the following paragraph:
1.72 It is recognized that the introduction of new technologies, including fully mech-
anized and robotic-operated marine terminals, necessarily displaces traditional long-
shore work and workers, including the operating, maintenance and repair, and as-
sociated cleaning of stevedore cargo handling equipment. The parties recognize
robotics and other technologies will replace a certain number of equipment opera-
tors and other traditional longshore classifications. It is agreed that the jurisdiction
of the ILWU shall apply to the maintenance and repair of all present and forthcom-
ing stevedore cargo handling equipment in accordance with Sections 1.7 and 1.71
and shall constitute the functional equivalent of such traditional ILWU work. [...]
For the first time, the contract explicitly allowed full automation on terminals. Not only
was automation allowed in principle, but the union acknowledged that automation could
go on even if it was known to cost union jobs.
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A written contract is one thing, whether it makes a difference in behavior is another. Port
terminals may have had no intention to ever automate terminals. Conversely, the ILWU
may have never had any intention of opposing automation if it had not been explicitly
allowed. These possibilities seem unlikely. The first is the most obviously false: port
terminals did automate. They used technology that was known about in 2008 and that
other ports had already implemented. The second, that even without this provision, the
union would not have opposed automation, also seems wrong for a similar reason. Even
with the provision in place, the ILWU has vocally opposed automation has it has happened.
In 2020, ILWU president Willie Adams urged California governor Gavin Newsom oppose
automation there Tirschwell (2020) . In Washington State, the union has fought against
state grants for replacing existing machine with low-emission ones that also use less labor
Editorial (2021). What the union has not done is stage strikes or otherwise disrupt work
on the docks, which would be a violation of the terms. There is therefore good reason to
assume employers and employees take the contract as binding.
The contract for the period at the end of the data is not the 2008 contract; it was one
signed in 2015. The 2015 contract did not make as many sweeping changes and it kept
the paragraph on automation. It is important to consider, though, because even if the
contract itself was unremarkable, the negotiations were far more aggressive than in 2008,
culminating in a work slowdown in early 2015. Figure 2.1 shows the total number of vessels
coming to the West Coast. The effects of the slowdown are visible in the 200 fewer vessels
appearing than there otherwise would have been. When I’m studying the effects of these
contracts the written clauses are important, but so, too, are the signals each party may
give in how it plans to operate for the coming years.
2.3 Model
I build a simple production function as a framework for understanding productivity, changes
to it, and how aggregation could affect its measurement.
2.3.1 Production function
Ports convert the inputs of labor, port infrastructure, and ships into the output of imported
goods. The total amount of goods a ship unloads is a function of the size of the ship and
the port where it is unloading. For unloading i at time t,
Qit = BptS
η
ite
εsize,it (2.1)
where Qit is the quantity to be unloaded, Sit is the size of the ship, and Bpt is a port p,
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time t fixed effect. εsize,it is an i.i.d. demand shock or measurement error.
For a ship unloading Q, the terminal operator chooses the labor necessary to unload the
ship. Port infrastructure and ship size are taken as given by the operator. The operator
chooses the minimum Lit necessary to solve
Qit = L
α
itK
σ
itS
γ
ite
ωpt+νit (2.2)
where Lit is labor, Kit is capital, Sit is the size of the ship, ωpt is a port-level productivity
term, and νit is a random productivity shock (unobserved by everyone). Note that the ship
size appears here as well as equation (2.1). The rationale is that ship sizes determine not
only how much exists to be unloaded, but also the rate of unloading. For example, if there
are fixed costs of unloading any ship, a larger one may be unloaded faster than two smaller
vessels carrying the same quantity. There may also be diseconomies. Equations (2.1) and
(2.2) are flexible enough to allow both.
Lit is clearly a function of the other variables, and because Qit is a direct function of size
2
, we can rewrite it as
Lit =
( Bpt
eωpt+νit
Sη−γit K
−σ
it
) 1
α
Logged, this becomes
`it = b̃pt +
(η − γ)
α
sit −
σ
α
kit + ω̃pt + ν̃it
≡ (η − γ)
α
sit + fpt + ν̃it
(2.3)
where lowercase letters signify logs and x̃ = 1αx. (Because εsize,it and νit are both i.i.d. I
absorb the former in the latter.) I further assume that all ships entering a given port in a
given month have the same access to capital, so kit = kpt and I collapse all the port-time
level variables into a single variable fpt.
Logged labor productivity is
qit − `it =
(α− 1)η + γ
α
sit + gpt − ν̃it (2.4)
where gpt is a port-time level effect. Unless (α − 1)η + γ = 0, there are thus scale effects
from the size of the ship. If (1 − α)η < γ, there are economies of scale, if (1 − α)η > γ,
there are diseconomies.
2 There is some abuse of notation here. The relationship in equation (2.1) relates the stock of quantity
to the stock of size, whereas the production function also considers time (i.e., total worker-hours rather than
total workers.
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2.3.2 Effects of new contract
The new contract affects production through a combination of new capital (kpt) and port-
wide productivity (ωpt). These changes would show up as level shifts through the gpt term
in equation (2.4). For most of the series, I cannot distinguish between demand shifts (b̃pt),
capital investment, and productivity changes, so changes to the combination of all of them,
gpt, is the object of interest. After a new contract in year, the port level productivity gpt
becomes gpt + cy. This cy is the effect of the contract, not necessarily automation itself. In
the case where I do observe a terminal becoming fully automated, I allow that to have a
different effect.
2.3.3 Aggregate versus average productivity
“Aggregate”productivity is defined as the ratio of coast-wide output over coast-wide inputs.
“Average”productivity is the average of the ratios of unloading-level output over unloading-
level inputs. Neither measure is more “correct” than the other but their usefulness depends
on the question being asked. (See Basu and Fernald (2002) for examples of how aggregate
may be useful even when it does not reflect technological change.) I am interested in a
change in technology, broadly defined, rather than between-port reallocation or changes in
inputs, and therefore need to measure average. Because of scale economies and changes in
inputs, these values may not be the same.
A simple decomposition shows the relationships between the two. For each unloading i, Qi
is the quantity unloaded and Li is the labor employed. The labor productivity of unloading
i is simply Ai ≡ QiLi . Let A be the aggregate labor productivity, i.e.,
A ≡ Q
L
≡
∑
iQi∑
i Li
It is clear that aggregate productivity is not the simple average of ship-level productivities.
Rearranging, we get
∑
iQi∑
i Li
=
∑
i
Qi
Li
× Li∑
i Li
=
∑
iAi × Li∑
i Li
=
E [AiLi]
E [Li]
=
Cov (Ai, Li)
E [Li]
+ E [Ai]
⇒ A = E [Ai]
(
corr (Ai, Li) + 1
)
If the unloadings with higher labor productivity A are correlated with more labor employed,
the measured aggregate productivity A will be higher than the average A. If higher labor
productivity is correlated with less labor, the opposite will be true. Returning to the
parameterized production function: holding all else equal, if there are decreasing returns for
labor (α < 1) we would expect to see unloadings with more labor to have lower productivity:
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Source Variables
PMA dispatch summaries vessel hours at port, total hours worked per ves-
sel, total gangs employed per vessel
PMA annual reports aggregate hours, aggregate tonnage
www.vesseltracking.net vessel sizes
Bills of lading containers unloaded per vessel
Table 2.1: Data Sources
corr (Ai, Li) is negative, and A < E [Ai]. If there are increasing returns, we would expect
to see the opposite, A > E [Ai].
I am interested in changes in productivity. If there were only a level difference between
A and E [Ai] that was constant over time, looking at A would be sufficient. However,
labor is not the only input. Ships sizes are changing during this period, which means
corr (Ai, Li) is also changing over time. To accurately measure the average productivity, I
need unloading-level data.
2.4 Data
Table 2.1 lists the data sources I use. The dispatch summaries from the Pacific Maritime
Association (PMA) are the most important as these contain fifteen years (2005-2020) of
labor data for four ports on the West Coast of the United States: Seattle, Tacoma, Oakland,
and Los Angeles/Long Beach. (Los Angeles and Long Beach are actually two separate
ports, but they are close enough to draw on the same pool of labor.) I match the dispatch
summaries with data from www.vesseltracking.net for vessel sizes. I also match the vessel
sizes to bill of ladings from 2007-2015, in order to measure the relationship between ship
size and quantity unloaded.3 I would ideally match the dispatch summaries with the bills
of lading, but differences in how the two datasets record when a vessel enters a port makes
the matching non-trivial.
In Table 2.2, I list summary statistics for some of the main variables. My main measure
of interest will typically be containers per gang-hour conditioned on vessel size. I do not
observe the relationship directly, but I am able to observe the relationship between con-
tainers and size and between gang-hours and size, and from these I can indirectly measure
the relationship between containers and gang-hours.
Not visible in the table but important for my story are time trends taking place during
3 Bills of lading are more or less receipts for transporting goods by ship. I use data originally prepared
for Holmes and Singer (2018) and thank Tom Holmes and Ethan Singer for sharing their data.
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Figure 2.1: Vessels Docking at West Coast
this time. Figure 2.1 shows the total number of vessels docking each month on one of the
four ports in the sample. There are many fluctuations, from business cycles, seasonality,
and idiosyncratic reasons (like the 2015 work slowdown), but overall there is not a clear
trend up or down. A very different graph is Figure 2.2, which shows the average ship length
over the same period. Here there is a clear trend upward of 10-15%. I will argue that the
economies (or diseconomies) of scale from larger vessels has a major impact on productivity,
and failure to consider these changes in the inputs for the ports will bias any productivity
measures.
To my knowledge, the dispatch summaries have not been used in any prior research. Gath-
ering and preparing them in a usable form is a contribution of this chapter, so I will briefly
describe their construction.
The dispatch summary includes the name of the vessel, how many new gangs to work it,
how many gangs are returning, the date and time of the shift, and the date and time of
the vessel’s arrival. Figure 2.3 shows what each page looks like. Summaries go back to
the end of 2004 and up to the present. I limit the sample to spring of 2005 to the end of
2019 because of spotty observations early on and to avoid any impact of the COVID-19
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Figure 2.2: Average Vessel Length
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Mean Standard deviation Min Max Obs
Total gangs 9.70 10.6 1 132 95,620
Total work hours 24.6 20.7 5 513 95,620
Total gang-hours 409 803 5 47,520 95,620
Total hours 44.9 80.4 5 8,532 95,620
Length (m) 252 67.5 6.18 400 63,771
Containers unloaded 386 1,201 1 15,287 38,041
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
pandemic.
The unit of observation is a stop at a port with at least one hour of work requested, what
I call an “unloading.” (Some vessels show up for only a few shifts and are idle the whole
time. I drop these from the sample.) I identify an unloading by the combination of vessel
name, port, and arrival date. When a vessel no longer appears in the summary dispatches,
I assume it has left the port. The “total hours in port” are the sum of the shifts the vessel
appears in. The “total hours working” are the sum of the shifts where the status is listed as
“working.” (In Figure 2.3, all the vessels in this shift were being worked on except for the
Azure Sky, which was idle.) The “total gangs” is the running total Gangs Worked to Date
in the last shift of the stop. Sometimes this column is blank, in which case I use Gangs To
Complete. Finally, the “gang-hours” are the product of the total number of gangs and the
total number of hours of work.
The summaries list the total number of “gangs” requested. The number of workers on each
gang is not listed. If the number or types of workers on a gang were flexible or changing
over time, that would bias labor productivity. However, that does not appear to be the
case. Contract rules are clear about what kinds of workers compose a gang and how many
of them there are, and these rules do not change over time. It is of course possible that as
technology changes, these workers are not performing the same tasks. I do not take a stand
on whether these particular rules are efficient or not.
2.5 Estimation
Each observation is at the level of unloading. For each estimation, I also run a version with
aggregated data at the port and coast level. These versions are identical to the estimations
at the level of unloading except for fixed effects that cannot be identified at more aggregated
levels.
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Figure 2.3: Screenshot of a dispatch summary
2.5.1 Productivity
My primary measure of productivity is quantity unloaded per gang-hour. Quantity is
measured in containers but here a “container” is just a unit of measure equivalent to 17
tons for bulk goods.
To construct this productivity measure for each unloading I need to know the amount of
labor used, the size of the vessel, and the amount unloaded. The largest sample includes
labor used and vessel size, and a smaller sample includes vessel size and amount unloaded.4
I can therefore regress
qit = βssit + PortFEs + εs,it (2.5)
directly on the smaller sample and use this to predict qit for all unloadings and to identify
η from equation (2.1), βs,1. Note that the fixed effect here does not vary with time. This
is a limitation of this particular sample, which displays plenty of cross-sectional variation
but only for a limited number of years. I use the larger sample to regress
`it = βprodsit + Port× TimeFEprod + εprod,it (2.6)
which identifies η−γα from (2.3).
5 Because the data are highly heteroskedastic and I
am measuring an elasticity, I use Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood following Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) and Sun et al. (2011).
4 Merging these two into a single dataset is theoretically straightforward. In practice it requires matching
not only vessels but vessel-date-port tuples. Small differences in when a vessel is recorded to have docked
make the problem messy.
5 I cannot identify α and γ separately, though this is unimportant for my main question.
45
2.5.2 Effects of contracts
Let the estimated productivity be âit = q̂it − ˆ̀it, where hats signify predicted values. I am
interested in the effects cy of the new contracts. Because the contract effect is the same
for any port to which it applies, I would ideally see both ports affected and unaffected. If
productivity trends were the same for all ports, I could measure cy simply by comparing
the differences across ports. However, the contracts are coast-wide, and I therefore need to
make additional assumptions. I assume that outside of the effect of the contracts, growth
in gpt is constant, gpt = constantp + rpt. Including a time trend then accounts for these
additional effects.
I estimate the regression
âit = βLLit +
∑
c
1{t∈c}βc +
∑
p
1{port=p}
(
δp + rp × t
)
+ εit (2.7)
This is the empirical version of equation (2.4) with the effects of the contracts. The param-
eters βc identify the effects of contracts cy. I also include the logged length of the vessel
on the right-hand side for the sake of symmetry with equation (2.4), though recall that âit
is a deterministic function of Lit and therefore the coefficient βL here does not have any
separate meaning; it’s just to condition on size.
There are good reasons to be unsatisfied with just including a time trend. First, it is unlikely
productivity growth is constant over time, and it is not difficult to think of patterns in the
data that could lead to inaccurate estimates. Suppose productivity is roughly constant
until a plunge near the end of the period. The time trend would be negative, and the
estimated contract effects would be inflated. On the other hand, suppose that all changes
in productivity are due to the new contracts, that there is otherwise no other trend. Some
of that growth will be attributed to the linear trend, and so I will actually underestimate
the effects of the contract.
2.5.3 Effects of automation
I cannot fully address the issues just described because I do not observe a group of ports
unaffected by the contracts. However, even though all ports were allowed to automate after
2008, only a few terminals actually did. I can, then, compare ports that automated to those
that did not while holding fixed any coast-wide time effect. I regress the following
âit = βL,autoLit + 1{it∈auto}βauto +
∑
p,t
1{port=p,time=t}δpt + εit (2.8)
Here, rather than a linear time trend, there are separate port-month fixed effects allowed
to vary flexibly. The indicator 1{it∈auto} is positive only for ports with a terminal that
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automated. Only one port had such a terminal, and it only automated in 2016, so I can
estimate the differential impact of automation with more confidence.
I should emphasize here that (2.8) is not a better version of (2.7). The equations are
measuring different effects. It is possible that even among ports that did not build fully
automated terminals, the new terms led to changes in productivity. Perhaps terminal
operators were more likely to make technical investments short of fully automation, being
less uncertain about potential union responses. Workers may also have behaved differently,
knowing future automation was a real possibility. As often happens, there is one effect that
I am most interested in knowing and which is hard to reliably estimate. There is another
which is easier to accurately estimate and is of less interest. In this chapter I report both.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Productivity
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the relationship between quantity unloaded and length and labor
employed and size, respectively. The leftmost column of each table includes the fixed effects
described in the Estimation section. In the next two columns of each, I aggregate up to the
port level and then the entire coast level and perform similar regressions. I say “similar”
because of course more aggregated versions are not necessarily identified with port-time or
even port-level fixed effects. I also show versions of Unloading and Port without any fixed
effects to make the regressions more comparable; these are the last two columns of each.
The quantity unloaded roughly increases with the square of the length of the ship. This
makes sense: if quantity moves one-to-one with volume and ships differed only by length,
a ship twice as long would hold twice as much and we would expect a linear relationship
between length and quantity. If a twice as long ships was also twice as wide and had a
draft twice as high, we would expect a cubic relationship. The reality is likely somewhere
in between, which is what we estimate.
The amount of labor necessary increases at a faster rate, 2.76. That βprod is greater than
βs is important: it means that the additional output a larger vessel brings requires more
than a proportional amount of labor to unload; there are diseconomies of scale.
In Figure 2.4 I plot the containers per gang-hour using the coast-wide aggregate labor
productivity and the productivity of the average unloading. This shows levels, rather than
the changes I am estimating in the regressions, but already it is clear that 1) aggregate and
average persistently differ and 2) the amount by which they differ varies over time.
Aggregation has large effects on the estimated parameters.6 In Table 2.3, an estimation
6 The variables used here are the logged total number of containers, logged total gang-hours, and logged
sum of the lengths of all unloadings. If I use logged mean lengths I get similar results.
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even at the level of port-month produces an elasticity of about zero. Table 2.4 is even more
dramatic, there the sign of βprod actually flips at the port level.
Unloading Port
βs 2.08*** 0.0741
(0.119) (0.0540)
Fixed Effects? Y Y
N 31,182 72
Table 2.3: Containers unloaded as function of ship length
*: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001. Fixed effects are port fixed effects for columns one and two.
Unloading Port
βprod 2.76*** -2.90*
(0.0639) (1.45)
Fixed Effects? Y Y
N 62,055 703
Table 2.4: Labor employed as function of ship length
*: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001. Fixed effects are port × month for first column and separate
port and time for second.
2.6.2 Effects of contracts
Column 1 of Table 2.5 shows the main results of the contracts. Removing the trend,
the 2008-2015 contract increased labor productivity by about 25%. The productivity falls
during the regime of the third contract to only 15% above the pre-2008 level. Though I
include standard errors in this table as in previous ones, these have not been adjusted for
the fact that the left-hand side of the regressions is itself an estimator.
The fall in the productivity during the 2015-2019 contract may appear puzzling. The time
trend (not shown) is negative, which means β2015−2019 is, if anything, likely to be biased
up. There was nothing in the 2015 contract that retracted the automation clause in the
2008 one. In fact, actual automation did not begin in earnest until 2016, when the 2015
contract was in effect. What could explain the drop?
One possibility is that, as noted earlier, though the 2015 contract did not include many novel
clauses, the negotiation process surrounding it was contentious. The fact that it was a a
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Figure 2.4: Coast-wide versus average unloading productivity
contract signed in 2015 rather than when the old one expired in 2014 highlights how drawn-
out the negotiating process was compared to 2008. The actual work slowdown in early 2015
does not explain the difference; that occurred in the previous contract regime. However, if
after the 2008 contract the ILWU appeared surprisingly cowed, the 2015 slowdown made
clear that was not the case. Employers who previously may have expected less push back
from automation or further changes to work rules could have updated their beliefs, as would
have the workers themselves. In fact there has been almost a cyclical nature to negotiations:
after a lockout in 2002, there was little drama in 2008, followed by the slowdown in 2014-
2015 Mongelluzzo (2015).
Table 2.5 also shows results for port and coast aggregations. As with the earlier regressions,
the results are very different from the unloading. At the coast level, there is basically no
effect. At the level of port, the effect is much larger and the relative order is flipped,
β2015−2019 is actually greater than β2008−2015.
At this point I should emphasize again that the regressions in the second and third columns
of Table 2.5 are not wrong or meaningless. The port-level labor productivity is a well-defined
object. “Aggregate length” is maybe less well-defined (or at least objections could be raised
to the way in which I am aggregating it), but a notion of total capacity is certainly coherent.
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However, as I am studying the effect on the technology, on the process of unloading itself,
these are not the numbers I am interested in.
At level of... Granular (Unloading) Aggregate (Port)
β2008−2015 0.259*** 0.874***
(0.00629) (0.107)
β2015−2019 0.146*** 1.30***
(0.0126) (0.217)
N 62,056 466
Table 2.5: Contract effects on logged containers per gang-hour
*: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001. Not shown: Time trend and port fixed effects.
2.6.3 Effects of automation
Table 2.6 shows the results of the difference-in-difference with the Long Beach Container
Terminal becoming fully automated in April 2016. The containers per gang-hour produc-
tivity increased by around 15% compared to the other ports at the same time. This is a
sizeable increase, but it’s less than a quarter of the estimated effect using data aggregated
at the port level.
Granular (Unloading) Aggregate (Port)
βauto 0.146* 0.629*
(0.0676) (0.264)
Port FE? Y Y
Time FE? Y Y
N 62,056 466
Table 2.6: Long Beach automation difference-in-difference
*: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the port level.
Figure 2.5 shows the regression visually. The points are the differences from the mean
productivity conditional on port, time, and ship size. Productivity in Long Beach actually
fell, it just fell less than at all other ports.
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Figure 2.5: Gang-hours before and after LBCT automation
2.7 Robustness
I extrapolate quantity unloaded–and through that, productivity–based on bill of ladings
data that is incomplete in two ways. First, the data do not cover the full time period but
only a handful of months in 2007, 2008, and 2012-2015.7 These dates do not include a
post-automation time period, but I can run a version of the estimation of contract effects
using only these dates. Second, the bill of ladings only includes containerships. Ships are
specialized for different kinds of cargo and the relationship between quantity and size may
not be constant across different types. I therefore re-estimate the effects of contracts using
only containerships.
Table 2.7 shows the effects of the 2008 contract in an estimation limited to only the months
were I observe quantity unloaded directly. I cannot estimate β2015−2019 because these dates
do not go beyond March 2015. The aggregate estimate is still higher than the granular,
though they are closer and not statistically significantly different. At least part of this
is because the sample sizes are a tenth of the full sample. There is also only one month
7 The specific months covered are December 2007; November and December 2008; November and
December 2012; January, February, March, November, and December 2013, January, February, March,
November, and December 2014; and January, February, and March 2015.
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At level of... Granular (Unloading) Aggregate (Port)
β2008−2015 0.566*** 0.616*
(0.0154) (0.306)
N 6,227 49
Table 2.7: Contract effects on logged containers per gang-hour: restricted dates
*: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001. Not shown: Time trend and port fixed effects.
outside of the 2008 contract regime in this sample, so the results are highly dependent on
that specific time. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that the orders of magnitude and signs
are not different across specifications.
At level of... Granular (Unloading) Aggregate (Port)
β2008−2015 0.348*** 0.523***
(0.00520) (0.0854)
β2015−2019 0.281*** 0.745**
(0.0113) (0.195)
N 52,291 454
Table 2.8: Contract effects on logged containers per gang-hour: containerships
*: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001. Not shown: Time trend and port fixed effects.
In Table 2.8, I show the results of estimating the contract and automation effects, respec-
tively, with only containerships in the sample. Notice that the total number of observations
is not that much lower than the full sample: the vast majority of unloadings at these ports
are from containerships. The patterns are largely the same as with the full sample, though
as in the sample restricted to certain dates, the estimates values for the aggregate and gran-
ular versions are closer. As the ships in the sample become more homogeneous, it makes
sense that aggregation loses less information.
The granular results for both regressions may be biased downwards if there is measurement
error in the independent variables. In Appendix B I discuss where this error may occur and
how it compares to the aggregation bias.
2.8 Conclusion
Far beyond just determining pay or labor supplied, unions can determine the technology of
production itself. In this chapter, I have shown how an unprecedented change in the ILWU
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contract led to productivity growth of 25%. Part of this was surely the automation itself,
but there was also growth before any of the terminals were actually automated. In fact, the
period of time when the terminals were automated was actually one of less growth, though
the terminal itself had a positive effect. Beyond the formal rules of what is allowed and
disallowed, the general attitude the union and employers take towards one another likely
affects day-to-day work and productivity. If the ILWU decides it has been taken advantage
of in recent negotiations, productivity may suffer even as the set of technically allowed
investments expands.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Charter rates
Drewry Insights publishes average daily charter rates for container ships of various sizes.
These rates do not include fuel but include labor, insurance, and other operational costs.
Most carriers own most of their own fleets, but most also charter at least some ships and
so it is reasonable to assume the charter rates cannot vary much from the cost of operating
an owned vessel (they certainly cannot be much lower).
I observe 43 observations from 2004 to 2018. The sizes listed are 500, 700, 3,500, 4,250,
5,000, and 8,500 TEU. I estimate
log charter ratei = constant + (1− γcharter) log TEUi +
2018∑
t=2004
τt1yeari=t + εi
(Jansson and Shneerson (1978)) and (Cullinane and Khanna (1999)) use an annualized
capital cost by regressing the price of newly built ships on size. I use charter rates rather
than newbuilds as I do not have the data on costs like crew that these other papers use for
my main results. However, I perform a similar regression to compare my number to past
ones, and get very similar results. (See Table 1.7.)
A.2 Fuel costs
In their paper on hull design efficiency, (Faber et al. (2016)) use the following relationship
between power, speed, and physical dimensions:
logPME = c× log (V × frictional resistance)
where c is a constant, V is speed, and “frictional resistance” is a complicated expression
that depends on speed, length, draft, and beam. I know that the power required to move
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the Maersk ship Emma is 80,800 kilowatts and I use this to get the correct constant c. For
the speed I use the design speed. Finally, the relationship between fuel consumption and
power is
FC = SFOC × PME
where FC is fuel consumption and SFOC is the specific fuel consumption of the engine.
(Faber et al. (2016)) use a value of 190, though (Cullinane and Khanna (1999)) use the
much lower 125. I use 170. This value is not unimportant as it affects the total fuel usage
linearly, but the final results do not change much if I vary it from 100 to 200. (At 100 the
final γ is 0.34 rather than 0.28; at 200 it is 0.26.)
A.3 Total cost
To get total costs, I convert the fuel usage to daily fuel usage assuming 24 hours of move-
ment. I take the cost of fuel to be $493, which was the average Brent oil price from 2002 to
2019. (Bunker fuel and crude oil prices are close and move together.) I add the predicted
fuel costs to predicted charter costs, take the log, and regress on logged TEU,
log (predicted charteri + predicted fueli) = constant+ (1− γ) log TEU + εi
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Aggregation bias or measurement error?
If observations are measured with error, the granular regressions will be biased towards
zero and may be no more reliable than the aggregated regressions. In fact, for classical
measurement error, aggregating by groups may lead to more consistent results ((Pakes,
1983)).1
There are two potentially important sources of measurement error in the data I use. First,
I observe hours at the level of a shift. If a ship is present and being worked on at the
beginning of a shift, I do not observe if it stays the whole shift, leaves halfway through, or
leaves one hour after the shift starts. A second source of error are worker types. There is
a rigid seniority list in who is called up for work. In periods of less work, the only people
called will be senior union members, who have longer tenure and more experience. When
there is more work the employers may call up people from the casuals roll, who have much
less experience. I treat these workers as identical, potentially erasing important differences
in productivity.
That being said, there are good reasons to think there is also aggregation bias. Arthur Lew-
bel has shown that for log-linear models, a sufficient and necessary condition for aggregated
regressions to return the same parameters as granular regressions is that the distribution
of the right-hand side variables are “mean scaled” ((Lewbel, 1992)). In other words, if ship
lengths are xipt and the mean ship length at each port-year-month level is Xpt, then the
distribution of a variable zipt ≡ xiptXpt should be independent of Xpt.
2
In Figure B.1, I show the relationship between the mean vessel size and another moment
of its distribution, standard deviation. Clearly, the distribution of size is not independent
1 I thank Amil Petrin for pointing this out.
2 An intuitive example from Lewbel is personal income. Personal income is mean scaled if the Gini
coefficient does not change with mean income.
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Figure B.1: Mean vessel length versus standard deviation
of the mean size. Port-year-months with larger vessels on average also have less dispersion.
Unfortunately it is difficult to say the direction of the bias without knowing the value of
the true parameter, but in the case of log normally distributed variables the magnitude
increases in proportion to the covariance between logXpt and standard deviation. The
granular results are therefore at the very least a lower bound, but it is not clear whether
the aggregate results are above or below the true values.
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